Abstract: This paper studies the behaviour of the international business cycle across 25 advanced and emerging market economies for which 125 years of annual GDP data are available. The picture that emerges is more fragmented than the one drawn by studies that focused on a narrower set of advanced market economies. The paper offers evidence in favour of a secular increase in international business cycle synchronization within a group of European and a group of English-speaking economies that started off during 1950-1973 and accelerated since 1973. Yet, in other regions of the world, country-specific shocks are still the dominant forces of business cycle dynamics.
INTRODUCTION
During the past three decades, the world economy has moved towards closer integration.
International trade flows have increased substantially, financial markets in developed and emerging economies have become increasingly integrated, significant parts of the world economy that were hitherto relatively insulated opened up to free trade and capital flows, and continental European countries adopted a single currency. These developments raise the possibility of changes not only in the properties of national business cycles but also in their synchronization.
The large body of research that explored the effects of these structural changes on business cycle behaviour has produced mixed results. One branch of the literature has concluded that evidence from a wide range of industrial and developing economies does not lend strong support to the hypothesis that increasing international trade and financial market integration has led to an increase in the degree of business cycle synchronization (Kose et al, 2003 (Kose et al, , 2008 . Another branch of the literature, focusing specifically on the experience of advanced industrial economies, has detected the emergence of a 'European business cycle' since the early 1980s (Artis and Zhang, 1997 , 1999 , and Artis, 2004 while more recent evidence suggests that, as the process of international trade and financial market integration deepens, such regional business cycle affiliations are superseded by wider business cycle clubs (Artis, 2008 ). Yet other studies have found that output correlations among the major industrial countries have even decreased in the recent decades, largely on account of a remarkable cycle of de-synchronization in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Helbling and Bayoumi, 2003 , Doyle and Faust, 2002 , 2005 . Overall, and despite a number of significant contributions, it would be fair to say that the state of our knowledge about the effects of integration on crossnational business cycle linkages remains imperfect and largely limited to the very recent period.
The goal of this paper is to contribute towards a better understanding of the effects of globalization on business cycle co-movements by adding to the debate a historical dimension. To this end, the paper studies the behaviour of business cycles in 25 countries for which at least 125 years of annual data are available. In so doing, the paper aims to 2 document some of the salient features of national business cycle behaviour and examine changes in the pattern of cross-national business cycle synchronization over time. We know that in many respects the countries of our sample and the historical periods that we cover have been markedly different. They differ in terms of their institutions, their monetary and fiscal policies, their economic structures, their natural endowments and their growth record.
The question is whether, despite these differences, the forces of economic integration that swept the world economy during 1880-1913 and, again, since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates have led to greater economic interdependence and more synchronization. Seeking an answer to this question is important for several reasons, not least, because greater business cycle synchronization would require tighter macroeconomic policy co-ordination during economic downturns if the experience of beggar-thy-neighbour policies of the 1930s were to be avoided.
A variety of data and empirical methodologies suggest that the historical process of trade and capital market integration has followed a distinctive 'U-shape' pattern, with momentum peaking at the beginning and at the end of the twentieth century, but coming to a halt during the years of the two World Wars and the Great Depression (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003, 2004) . These ebbs and flows of integration cover a period of more than a century and cut across a wide range of international monetary regimes. The main question we address is whether the degree of business cycle synchronization across a large number of advanced and emerging market economies follows the same stylized 'U-shape' pattern. In so doing, we also examine whether the effect of financial market integration on the international business cycle, if any, varies with the constraints imposed on domestic macroeconomic policy by the international monetary regime. We do so by splitting the sample in four different subperiods, each of which corresponds to a distinct international monetary regime (Eichengreen 1996) . The period from 1880 to 1913 corresponds to the classical Gold Standard, a period of credible commitment to pegged exchange rates and free trade and capital markets, often referred to as the first era of globalization of the world economy. The period from 1920 to 1939 is characterized by the failed attempt to restore the prewar liberal economic order in the context of a new institutional environment, the Great Depression, and the reversal of economic integration through the introduction of trade and capital controls. The period from 1950 to 1973 corresponds to the Bretton Woods era of fixed but 3 adjustable exchange rates and limited capital mobility as a means to prevent currency crises and confer some degree of autonomy to domestic monetary policy. Finally, the period from 1973 onwards, an era characterized by an unprecedented rise in trade and capital market integration, the formation of the European Monetary Union, and floating exchange rates among the main world currencies.
In addressing the above question, our study is closely related to earlier work by Backus and Kehoe (1992) , Bergman, Bordo, and Jonung (1998) , Basu and Taylor (1999), and Bordo and Helbling (2003) . These pioneering studies also examine the behaviour of business cycles over the long run and across different exchange rate regimes. Yet, our study departs from theirs in some fundamental ways. First, our study covers a much wider sample of countries. Unlike earlier international comparative studies that limit themselves to a rather narrow sample of advanced market economies, we use Barro and Ursua's (2008) dataset and cast our net across 25 advanced and emerging market economies. The benefit from doing so is large as no other study has looked at the effects of financial globalization on the historical properties of the international business cycle of emerging market economies. Second, we use an unobserved component model to estimate the business cycles of the countries of our sample. This method has not been used before by other international and historical studies and has the potential to significantly improve the measurement, and our understanding, of the historical properties of the international business cycle. Third, unlike earlier work, our study explores the channels through which financial market integration may affect the synchronization of national business cycles. In principle, financial market integration may increase business cycle synchronization, either by increasing the relative importance of international shocks, or by strengthening the spillover effects across countries, e.g., through contagion. We use a Factor Structural VAR model (Clark and Shin, 20000, Stock and Watson, 2005) to identify the relative importance of the channels through which trade and financial integration may have historically affected the international business cycle.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a discussion of the dataset and presents the business cycle definition and measurement method that we use.
Section 3 summarizes the changes in business cycle correlations across the four sub-periods of the sample. Section 4 uses a Factor Structural VAR model to identify the changing importance of international shocks, spillovers, and country-specific shocks in driving the international business cycle dynamics during the past 125 years. Section 5 concludes. Before proceeding, a caveat is in order. We know that the quality of national accounts data prior to World War II varies considerably across countries primarily because of differences in the availability of raw data sources. In countries with established annual income tax systems or statistical bureaus, the measurement of national account aggregates tends to be more accurate than is the case elsewhere. As a result, in some cases, the ex post reconstruction of historical national accounts is often based on extrapolations from fragmentary raw data that cover only a narrow subset of economic activity raising, thus, the likelihood of measurement error. Christina Romer's (1986 Romer's ( , 1989 criticism of prewar US national accounts data illustrates this point very well. Although recent progress in creating historical national accounts has significantly increased the accuracy of the data, we need to bear this caveat in mind when interpreting results.
Our focus is on economic fluctuations over business cycle horizons. It is common to distinguish two types of business cycles -the so-called 'classical' cycle and the 'deviation' cycle. The former is in the spirit of Burns and Mitchell's (1946) NBER business cycle project, where peaks are identified by being followed by absolute declines in output while troughs by absolute increases. Such cycles are, of course, comparatively rare in growth economies and to focus our attention only on these would lead to a paucity of observations, 5 at least, as far as the post-WWII period is concerned. The deviation cycle, by contrast, deals with deviations in output growth from trend growth and it is this concept of the cycle that we will use here. Thus, measuring deviation cycles requires the filtering out of the economy's trend growth rate. One way to do this is to use band-pass-filtered log GDP with a pass band that only admits business cycle frequencies (periods of 1½ to 8 years). The main drawback of this method is that a good deal of data has to be 'thrown away' at the two ends of the sample. An alternative method would be to consider simple annual growth rates which use differencing to eliminate the linear growth rate in the series. Despite the merit of simplicity, the drawback of this method is that the trend growth rate of GDP over the past 125 years cannot be assumed to be constant. Because a low frequency drift can introduce bias into certain statistics used later on, such as cross-country correlations computed over subsamples, in our analysis, we use a flexible detrending method based on a model with a stochastic drift (Clark 1987 , Harvey and Jaeger 1993 , Stock and Watson 2005 . Define as the annual growth rate of GDP. We adopt an unobserved components specification that represents as the sum of two terms, a slowly evolving mean growth rate (trend) and a stationary component (cycle):
where Standard as a period where country-specific shocks were dominant, hence, as a system that conferred some degree of domestic policy independence. We will return to this in section 4 when we discuss the changing significance of international and country-specific shocks in driving business cycle dynamics.
To the extent that the distribution of bilateral correlation coefficients within subperiods is not uniform, as it is not, the size and direction of changes in average correlation coefficients across subperiods for the country sample as a whole may hide information about patterns of international business cycle comovements within and between country subsamples. Tables 6 8 and 8 report the evolution of mean correlation coefficients for a number of country groups while Tables 7 and 9 shocks, therefore, it is important to distinguish between an international shock and a country-specific shock which has some spillover effects. In FSVAR models, shocks are identified by imposing a factor structure on the reduced form VAR innovations, such that, an international shock is identified as a shock that affects all countries simultaneously, while transmission of country-specific shocks affects the rest of the world with one period lag.
Because the definition of shocks depends on the frequency of data, Stock and Watson (2005) highlight that FSVAR models may tend to misclassify shocks in studies using high frequency data, e.g., with quarterly data, a world shock that hits one country and passes over to others with a lag of one or more periods may be identified as a country-specific shock that has spillover effects. However, this study is less likely to be affected by this, because we use annual data, in that an international shock is most likely to have an impact within a year, while an idiosyncratic shock may transmit to the trading partners with some lag. On the other hand, we are aware that idiosyncratic shocks that spread to other parts of the world within a year will be misclassified as international shocks and we bear this caveat in mind.
The basic framework of the model is described below, in that, represents annual growth rate of per capita real GDP for country i , where the error vector is assumed to be determined by the following factor structure:
where t  are common international factors that affects output in all countries simultaneously, G is a (n x k) vector of factor loadings, and i  is a country-specific shock.
  To proceed, we need to specify the lag structure for VAR dynamics and a value for k (the number of common factors). In specifying a lag structure in a multi-country factor model, one needs to be concerned about the dimensionality problem, because a higher lag structure leads to a larger number of coefficients to be estimated. Two solutions exist in the literature: first, to impose restrictions on VAR coefficients, e.g., specifying a different number of lags on domestic and foreign GDP growth rates, such as VAR(4,1) as in Stock and Watson (2005) i.e., four own lags and one foreign lag. While this option may seem to be more relevant to high frequency data, information criteria tests suggest a VAR(1,1) specification for the present study, which seems to be consistent with 2 Results are produced in GAUSS 6.0, using an appropriately amended version of Mark Watson's code.
annual data. The second option is to specify VARs for subsets of countries. This seems reasonable given the width and length of our dataset. However, grouping countries comes with a cost, because it tends to restrict the explanatory power of the model by limiting the international shocks and spillover effects. Therefore, we adopt a cautious approach, in that, we group the countries in such a way that a particular set of countries, conventionally classified as 'core countries' in modern economic history, stays together all the time with each subset of countries based on region. The core country group consists of the AngloSaxon countries (Canada, UK and US) and the 'core' European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands). We then specify another six groups of countries: the Nordic group (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden), the Western European group (Austria, Italy, and Switzerland), the Southern European group (Greece, Portugal and Spain), the Latin American group (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay), the Asian group (India, Japan, and Sri Lanka), and Australia. Each wave of Factor Structural VAR results consists of pooling the core country group together with one regional group.
The other key issue in estimating FSVAR models relates to the specification of the number of common factors (k). The literature points towards two approaches: first, formal tests can be performed to determine k, for example, Stock and Watson (2005) propose likelihood ratio tests, given that the FSVAR model is overidentified, in that, null hypothesis of k-factor structure is tested against the alternative of an unrestricted VAR. The number of common factors is determined at the level of k, which fails to reject the null. Also, Bai and Ng (2002) suggest information criteria preferably for a larger data set. The other approach is more of case-specific, in that, authors specify a number of k based on the empirical context of the research study. For example, Bergman and Jonung (2010) who examine business cycle synchronization of three Scandinavian economies impose two factors in order to allow for estimation of the relative importance of European wide shocks and Scandinavian shocks.
Further, Bordo and Helbling (2003) who examine business cycle synchronization over sixteen industrialized countries and across exchange rate regimes highlight opt for a one common factor (in the static factor model).
In this study, we first experiment with alternative k structures, to examine how sensitive the results are to the number of k specified. In doing so, we examine degrees of freedom issues, pertaining to subsample estimates, as highlighted in Bordo and Helbling (2003) . It turns out that one factor model seems to produce robust results (with more degrees of freedom), yet, without changing the results qualitatively. The degrees of freedom issue is a major concern here because we estimate the model across subsamples, in that, we consider four subsamples based on historical monetary regime classifications, namely, Classical Gold Standard (1880 -1913 ), Interwar Gold Standard (1920 -1939 ), Bretton Woods (1950 -1972 , and PostBretton Woods . Given the definition of factor structure k=1, we estimate the suggesting that the business cycle behaviour of these seven economies is shaped to a good extent by common international shocks. Third, the Anglo-Saxon group (Canada, UK, USA) allows a far larger role to idiosyncratic shocks and exhibits no secular change over time. The same is true for all four other groups, the Latin American, the Asian, the Nordic group and Australia. Fourth, Table 12 shows that although the Anglo-Saxon group historically shared a common factor with Europe, this hasn't been the case since 1973 pointing towards a weakening of comovements between the two country groups during the past forty years.
Indeed, this is one of the main findings of section 3 too. On the basis of the above evidence, one can safely argue that there is no secular change in the degree of synchronization since 1880 as many parts of the world economy do not share a common factor and their business cycles are driven by idiosyncratic shocks. The exception to this is a group of European countries where international shocks have played an increasingly significant importance in shaping the behaviour of the business cycle. This result is very much in line with the results of section 3 but qualify the conclusion of Bordo and Helbling (2011) whose study is based on a smaller sample of countries.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies the behaviour of the international business cycle across 25 advanced and emerging market economies for which 125 years of annual GDP data are available. The picture that emerges is far more fragmented than the one drawn by studies that focused on a narrower set of advanced market economies. The main results, and some directions for future research, can be summarized as follows. First, there is compelling evidence in favour of a secular increase in international business cycle synchronization within a group of European and a group of English-speaking economies that started off during 1950-1973 and accelerated since 1973. Based on the results of the Factor Structural VAR model, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that gradual trade integration since the 1960s diminished the relative significance of idiosyncratic shocks within a group of European countries and offered the springboard for the formation of the European Monetary Union. Second, the secular increase in the cyclical coherence within these two groups far outweighs the small rise in the cyclical coherence between the two groups, thus, it would be fair to describe these two cyclical groups as distinct. Future research should explicitly take into account the possibility of regional common factors to allow for the emergence of distinct cyclical groups. Third, the observed secular rise in business cycle synchronization does not extend outside this subset of advanced market economies. In other regions of the world, country-specific shocks are still the dominant forces of business cycle dynamics. Fourth, the lack of international business 15 cycle comovements during the Classical Gold Standard, i.e. a period of fixed exchange rates and free trade and capital mobility, merits our attention and should act as a trigger for future research, not least, in the direction of double-checking and improving the quality of historical national accounts data. In this respect, very recent work in extracting information on business cycle behaviour from less noisy economic aggregates than national accounts data is in the right trail. Fifth, the sharp increase in business cycle synchronization during the interwar years, as reflected in the almost universal increase in the fraction of the cyclical variance explained by the international shock and transmission, is consistent with the view that the Great Depression was a global monetary shock that was spread across world through the workings of the interwar Gold Standard. 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1920-1939 (b) 1920-1939 & 1950-1973 (c) 1950-1973 & 1973-2006 (d) 1920-1939 (b) 1920-1939& 1950-1973 (c) 1950-1973 & 1973-2006 (d) 1920-1939 (b) 1920-1939& 1950-1973 (c) 1950-1973 & 1973-2006 (d) 1920-1939 (b) 1920 -1939 & 1950-1973 (c) 1950 -1973 & 1973-2006 (d) 
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